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RECENT CASE NOTES
agreement binding on the parties, 9 and would fall within the rule of the
Massachusetts cases and the conduct on the part of the insurer was not to be
construed to be a waiver or admission of liability when taken pursuant to
the agreement. P. D. E.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-DEMAND FOR PERFORMANCE.-Appellant's assignor
contracted to sell a Florida lot to appellee for $3,600 and to deliver a deed
when one-fourth of the purchase price had been paid. Appellee made the
requisite payment September 28 1925, but neither received nor demanded a
deed. Thereafter, appellee executed and returned to the vendor six promissory
notes and a mortgage. On March 26, 1926, appellee paid the first note, still
neither demanding nor receiving a deed. When the second note matured,
September, 1926, appellee refused to pay it on the ground that the vendor had
breached his contract by failing to deliver a deed when one-fourth of the
purchase price was paid. Though demands were made upon him as the
other notes matured, appellee made no further payments. On March 29, 1927,
the vendor wrote that it had been advised appellee had never received a deed
and that it had had one placed on record for him. Vendor assigned the five un-
paid notes to appellant after maturity. Appellant sues thereon. Held, purchaser
not relieved from liability on purchase-money notes on ground of vendor's
breach of contract by failure to deliver deed at time stipulated or reasonably
soon thereafter, in absence of notice by purchaser to convey or demand for
conveyance and refusal by vendor to convey.1
The answer to the question as to when demand for performance of a
contract is necessary in order to put the other party in default, varies with
the several possible variations in the provisions of the contract. Time may
have been made of the essence of the contract. Time as the essence may have
been waived by the party entitled to performance. A reasonable time may
have been allowed. Again, one party may have acquiesced in the other
party's delay. The contract may not have fixed any time for performance.
When time has been made of the essence of a contract and there has been
no waiver of that condition by the party entitled to its performance, no demand
is necessary in order to put the other party in default when he has allowed
the time to go by without performing.
2
But when time has not been made of the essence or when no time has been
fixed at all, in which cases a reasonable time is allowed for performance, a
demand appears to be necessary.3 This position would seem to be supported
9 Contracts Restatement, Sec. 20; Sec. 29.
1 Allah Farms, Inc. v. Homer (1936), - Ind. App. -, 200 N. E. 740.
2 Richard v. Reeves (1898), 149 Ind. 427, 49 N. E. 348; Frazee v. McChord
(1848), 1 Ind. 224; Boldt v. Early (1904), 33 Ind. App. 434; Wheeler v. Garsia
(1867), 28 N. Y. Super. Ct. (5 Rob.) 280; Negus v. Simpson (1863), 99 Mass.
388; 13 C. J. 660; Gray v. Robertson (1898), 174 Ill. 242, 51 N. E. 248.
3Sheets v. Andrews (1829), 2 Blackf 274; Mather v. Scoles (1870),
35 Ind. 1; Sapinsky v. Jefferson County Construction Company (1923),
79 Ind. App. 557, 131 N. E. 846; Goodman v. Gordon (1882), 87 Ind. 126;
Frazee v. McChord (1848), 1 Ind. 224; Worley v. Mourning (1808), 4 Ky.
(1 Bibb.) 254; Adkins v. Ferrell (1897), 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1082, 42 S. W. 1145;
Weller v. Tuthill (1876), 66 N. Y. 347; Myers v. DeMier (1873), 52 N. Y. 647;
Northup v. Scott (1914), 148 N. Y. S. 846, 85 Misc. Rep. 515; McNamara v.
Pengilly (1894), 58 Minn. 353, 59 N. W. 1055; Walters v. Miller (1860), 10
Iowa 427; Gammon v. Bunnell (1900), 22 Utah 421, 64 P. 958; Fuller v. Hub-
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by a good policy. What constitutes a reasonable time varies so greatly with
the circumstances of each case as to make it practically impossible for the
courts to arrive at any reliable consistency in their decisions. Certainly, in
this state of affairs, the parties could not determine for themselves what rights
the mere lapse of time had given or taken from them. Inasmuch as the
primary object of demand is to enable one party to perform his obligation
or otherwise discharge his liability without being subjected to the inconvenience
and expense of litigation,4 the requirement recommends itself as a desirable
one. The most obvious opposition to the policy of requiring a demand will
arise at the instance of a party who has made a bad bargain and who seeks
to take advantage of a lapse of time to relieve himself therefrom. But courts
have long recognized the policy of giving a party to a contract the benefit or
detriment of his bargain when no element of legal unfairness attended the
making of the contract.5
When a provision in regard to time has been waived, it would seem,
in logic and on the authority of a well-reasoned case, to make no difference
whether or not time had originally been made of the essence of the contract; 6
for, when time as the essence has been removed, a reasonable time is then
allowed for performance. A demand is accordingly required to bring about a
default.7
The instant case is one in which time evidently was not of the essence of
the contract and in which the appellee has acquiesced in the delay to deliver
a deed by continuing to make payments beyond the time when he was entitled
to demand delivery of the deed as a condition precedent to such further
performance on his own part.8 Thus, this case falls within the last classification
bard (1826), 6 Cowen 13, 16 Am. Dec. 4-23, Kime v. Kime (1866), 41 Ill. 397;
Tisdale v. Bryant (1892), 38 Cal. App. 750, 177 P 510; Caner v. Owners'
Realty Company (1917), 33 Cal. App. 479, 165 P 727, 13 C. J. 660.
4 1 C. J. 979.
5 Forest Preserve, District of Cook County v. Emerson (1930), 341 Ill. 422,
173 N. E. 477, Keogh v. Peck (1925), 316 Ill. 318, 147 N. E. 266, Stauch v.
Daniels (1927), 240 Mich. 295, 215 N. W 311, Kerwin Machine Company v.
Baker (1917), 199 Mich. 122, 165 N. W 625, Wheat v. Thomas (1930), 209
Cal. 306, 287 P 102; Eakin v. Wycoff (1925), 118 Kan. 167, 234 P 63, Burge v.
Gough (1911), 153 Iowa 183, 133 N. W 340; Ann. Cas. 1912C, 556-562;
25 R. C. L. 225.
6 Taylor v. Goelet (1913), 208 N. Y. 253, 101 N. E. 867
7 Axtel v. Chase (1881), 77 Ind. 74, Baker v. Eades (1930), 90 Ind. App.
664, 169 N. E. 686; Taylor v. Goelet (1913), 208 N. Y. 253, 101 N. E. 867;
Northup v. Scott (1914), 148 N. Y. S. 846, 85 Misc. Rep. 515; Beechwood Gun
Club, Inc. v. City of Beacon (1933), 275 N. Y. S. 249, 153 Misc. 358; Houston
Bros. v. Dickson Planing Mill Company (1929), 159 Tenn. 10, 15 S. W. (2d)
74-9; Lamborn & Company v. Green & Green (1924), 150 Tenn. 38, 262 S. W
467, recognizing also the rule that demand is unnecessary when one party
unequivocally refuses to perform; Opejon v. Engebo (1913), 73 Wash. 324, 131
P 1146, Karr v. McAvoy (1933), - Wash. -, 28 P (2d) 118; Bay Minette
Land Company v. Stapleton (1932), - Ala. -, 139 So. 342; Lowy v. Rosen-
grant (1916), 196 Ala. 337, 71 So. 439; General Motors Acceptance Corporation
v. Hicks (1934), - Ark. -, 70 S. W (2d) 509; Boone v. Templeman (1910),
158 Cal. 290, 110 P 947, Black, Rescission and Cancellation, (2d Ed.), § 219;
4 A. L. R. 815.
8Lowy v. Rosengrant (1916), 196 Ala. 337, 71 So. 439; Axtel v. Chase
(1881), 77 Ind. 74, Columbia Airways v. Stevens (1932), 80 Utah 215, 14
P (2d) 984, Lawson v. Hogan (1883), 93 N. Y. 39.
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and a demand was necessary in order to put the vendor in default.0 No
demand having been made upon him the vendor was not in default at the
time he delivered, or at least tendered, the deed to appellee.
The cases on this subject have generally arisen in a different procedure
from the instant case, the plaintiff being the party who failed to establish
a default by making a demand for performance. Thus, the courts have
often employed language to the effect that a demand is necessary "before an
action can be brought." However, inasmuch as the objective in this type of
case is to determine whether or not there has been a default in performance,
it would seem to be incumbent upon the party asserting nonperformance to
establish the default of the other, whether that assertion be made in an
affirmative capacity or as a defense to an action brought against him.' 0
The decision of the appellate court in holding the appellee bound to make
a demand for delivery of the deed seems in this respect supportable. R. H. N.
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RESTATEMENT OF THE LAV OF PROPERTY, American Law Institute Publishers,
St. Paul, Minn.
These two volumes represent the initial effort toward the publication in
book form of the Restatement of the Law of Property by the American Law
Institute. From the Introduction-Division I-one learns that three more volumes
are to be published in this Restatment.
Volume I, entitled "Introduction and Freehold Estates," covers definitions
of general terms and terms relating to estates in chapters 1 and 2, and the
creation of and general characteristics of estates in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Volume II, entitled "Future Interests-Parts 1 and 2," covers the definitions,
creation and characteristics of Future Interests, this work to be completed in
the future in Volume III.
These two volumes follow the usual style of the Restatements heretofore
published by the Institute. The principle of law or the text is in bold type
and under each statement of text is accompanying comment, followed by
examples.
The stark precision of the language of the text does not make easy reading,
but leaves little room for ambiguity as a more liquid prose might do; however,
without any critical petulance, it might be wished that the text could have
been edited by a Holmes or a Cardozo. While the criticism to follow is
pertinent to all Restatements of the Institute, this writer sincerely believes it is
regrettable that there is so little explanation of the reasoning and of the
authority on which the presumably restated text is based.
9See note (7), supra.
10 Northup v. Scott (1914), 148 N. Y. S. 846, 85 Misc. Rep. 515: "Where the
time for performance of a contract is not fixed t - 0 it is presumed the
parties intended a reasonable time * 0 * In such case it would be in-
cumbent on either party desirous of preserving any legal remedy or availing
himself of a defense at law for a breach of the contract, to put the other
party in default by tendering performance on his part and demanding per-
formance by the other party within a reasonable time specified."
